Why are aggregate equity payouts pro-cyclical? by Huang-Meier, Winifred et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Why are aggregate equity payouts pro-cyclical?
Winifred Huang-Meier, Mark C. Freeman, Khelifa Mazouz
PII: S0164-0704(15)00024-5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2015.01.005
Reference: JMACRO 2762
To appear in: Journal of Macroeconomics
Received Date: 20 February 2014
Accepted Date: 20 January 2015
Please cite this article as: Huang-Meier, W., Freeman, M.C., Mazouz, K., Why are aggregate equity payouts pro-
cyclical?, Journal of Macroeconomics (2015), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2015.01.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers
we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
  
 
Why are aggregate equity payouts pro-cyclical? 
Winifred Huang-Meiera,*, Mark C. Freemanb and Khelifa Mazouzc 
 
a
 Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, B4 7ET, United Kingdom 
b
 School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, 
LE11 3TU, United Kingdom 
c Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive 
Cardiff, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 121 204 3490; fax: +44 121 204 4915 
 
E-mail addresses: w.huang-meier@aston.ac.uk (W. Huang-Meier), 
m.c.freeman@lboro.ac.uk (M.C. Freeman), mazouzk@cardiff.ac.uk (K. Mazouz) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We use two general equilibrium models to explain why changes in the external 
economic environment result in pro-cyclical aggregate dividend payout behavior. 
Both models that we consider endogenize low elasticity of investment. The first 
model incorporates capital adjustment costs, while the second one assumes that 
risk-averse managers maximize their own objective function rather than 
  
1 
 
shareholder wealth. We show that, while both models generate pro-cyclical 
aggregate dividends, a feature consistent with the observed business-cycle pattern 
of payouts from well-diversified portfolios, the second model provides a more 
likely explanation for this effect. Our findings emphasize the importance of 
incorporating agency conflicts when considering the relationship between the 
external economic environment and the financial behavior of businesses. 
Keywords: dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economies; payout policy; 
business fluctuations; firm objectives; capital adjustment costs 
JE: C63, C68, G35, E32, L21, E22 
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1 Introduction 
The observed correlation coefficient between the real aggregate dividends paid by 
firms and real GDP in the U.S. has been around +0.50 for many years.1  This 
phenomenon suggests that the payout policies of businesses are systematically 
and strongly affected by external changes in the economic environment. However, 
this clearly observed aggregate dividend pro-cyclicality is inconsistent with the 
predictions of large parts of the existing theoretical literature.2  Many general 
equilibrium models imply that investors should benefit from holding a portfolio 
                                                            
1
 The observation period is between 1984 and 2010.  For more details, please refer to 
Table 1 below. 
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with counter-cyclical equity payouts (e.g., Alessandrini, 2003; Carceles-Poveda, 
2009; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). These predictions arise because, in economic 
booms, many potentially profitable investment opportunities are available to firms 
who wish to reinvest.  In addition, since the marginal utility of consumption is 
low during strong economic conditions, investors are less likely to depend on 
dividend income at this time.  
In this paper, we describe two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models to explain why external changes in the economic environment 
should result in pro-cyclical aggregate equity payout behavior. We model an 
environment where firms and households simultaneously undertake constrained 
optimizations and market clearing conditions ensure that the economy remains in 
equilibrium. As a consequence, dividend and investment decisions are made 
simultaneous and neither is a ‘residual’ of the other. 
In the first set of models, managers aim to maximize their current share 
price while firms experience capital adjustment costs. This follows an extensive 
literature that is based on the observation that managers cannot immediately and 
perfectly adjust their real investment decisions (see, e.g., Jermann, 1998; Boldrin 
et al., 2001; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006; Gershun, 2010; Santoro and Wei, 
2011). This investment friction has previously played an important role in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2
 This issue is distinct from optimal firm-level payout behavior, which is the focus of 
attention in much of the dividend policy research in financial economics; see, for 
example, Bhattacharyya (2007) for a review of that field. 
  
4 
 
explaining a number of asset pricing phenomena based upon DSGE models. Both 
Jermann (1998) and Danthine and Donaldson (2002) have exploited it to present 
potential resolutions to the equity premium puzzle.  Christiano and Fisher (1995), 
by contrast, apply adjustment costs to Tobin’s Q and show that adjustments costs 
are related to the cyclical properties of equity prices and investment goods.     
 
In our second set of models we assume that there are no frictions, but 
agency conflicts exist. Specifically, we assume that managers maximize their own 
expected utility function rather than shareholders’ wealth (see, inter alia, Radner, 
1970; Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972; Carceles-Poveda, 2005, 2009).  This choice 
exploits the known similarity between models that incorporate risk-averse 
managers and those with capital adjustment costs. In particular, Carceles-Poveda 
(2003) has shown that, with appropriately matched parameter values, the 
equilibrium behavior of these two economies around the steady state is identical.   
A common key feature among these models is that they endogenize low 
elasticity of investment.  When this feature is combined with investors’ desire for 
dividend income as a source of consumption, more (less) money becomes 
available to pay out to shareholders in economic booms (recessions). This 
prediction is consistent with observed market behavior.  Thus, since both our 
models endogenize low elasticity of investment, if one model predicts pro-
cyclical dividends then so should the other; we confirm that here.  However, we 
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also show that the cyclicality of optimal dividend behavior is clearly distinct 
between the two models and, as a consequence, each is not equally plausible as an 
explanation. We find that while the required level of managerial risk aversion 
falls at the lower end of standard ranges, relatively high levels of capital 
adjustment costs are required to explain observed payout and consumption 
behavior. This evidence suggests that the economy with risk-averse managers 
offers a more realistic explanation to the dividend pro-cyclicality phenomenon.  
This conclusion is supported by the observation that the agency conflict model 
results are more robust to changes in the choice of parameter values.   
In order to test the overall performance of our DSGE models, we consider 
their explanatory power for a set of macroeconomic variables. This captures the 
pro-cyclicality and volatility of four variables: dividends, consumption, labor 
hours worked, and investment. The performances of the preferred specifications 
across the entire range of these diagnostics are the best amongst all the models 
considered. Resolving the anomaly of pro-cyclical aggregate dividends through 
either agency conflicts or capital adjustment costs comes with the additional 
benefit of increasing the overall ability of these models to explain the broader 
macroeconomy.   
This paper is most naturally compared with important recent studies by 
Carceles-Poveda (2009) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Carceles-Poveda 
(2009) focuses on the sensitivity of aggregate behavior to household 
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heterogeneity in an incomplete market economy both in the presence and absence 
of utility maximizing managers. Jermann and Quadrini (2012), by contrast, 
explain pro-cyclical equity payments through economy-wide financial shocks. We 
present a number of new findings.  First, we show that the pro-cyclicality of 
dividends can be explained in simple agency-conflict models with representative 
agents and no frictions. Second, we demonstrate that agency conflicts are more 
likely to resolve the dividend cyclicality puzzle than capital adjustment costs. 
Third, we extend the representative household’s utility function to allow for the 
presence of internal multiplicative habit formation; a feature that generally makes 
household consumption smoother (see, for example, Constantinides, 1990).  
Finally, we present detailed sensitivity analysis that demonstrates that the pro-
cyclicality of dividends will emerge in the utility maximizing manager model for 
a wide range of plausible parameter values.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
economic environment of the utility-maximizing manager, the value-maximizing 
firms with capital adjustment costs, and the “basic” model that has neither of 
these features. Section 3 reports our findings and Section 4 concludes. 
2 Economic Environment 
This section presents two economic models that can potentially explain the pro-
cyclicality of aggregate payout policy. The first model is based on a value-
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maximizing firm with capital adjustment costs (VM-CAC hereafter), while the 
second one assumes that managers maximize their own objective function rather 
than shareholders’ wealth (UM hereafter).  We initially present the assumptions 
that both models have in common and then introduce the differences. 
 
2.1 The Firm and Household  
The tax-free economy consists of a representative firm that is all-equity financed 
with one share in issue and a representative agent. There are no other investment 
opportunities available and, with the exception of capital adjustment costs in the 
VM-CAC model, there are no frictions.3  
At any given time, , the output,  , from the representative firm is given 
by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on both the capital, 
, and normalized labor hours,	, employed: 
 
where 	 and x denote a stochastic technology shock and the deterministic trend 
in labor augmenting technical change respectively. The parameters α and 1 − α 
                                                            
3
 With the exception of all-equity financing, these assumptions are identical to Jermann 
and Quadrini (2012). 
  = 	f, x = 	x (1) 
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are output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively.4  The d superscript on   
denotes a firm’s demand for labor. The technology shock process is assumed to 
follow a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) in logs and evolves 
exogenously as follows: ln	 = ln	 +   , where   is the parameter of 
persistence and  is an independent and identically normally distributed random 
variable ~0, .  The representative firm also pays dividends,  , to equity 
owners: 
 
where   	is the wage rate and !	is the amount re-invested by the firm.5   By 
controlling for the initial inputs  and , other variables (equity payouts, output 
and investment) are simultaneously endogenized along with the household’s 
problem.  
Many DSGE models are built with a time-separable utility function, which 
assumes that the representative household’s preferences are independently 
determined by consumption and leisure in each period. In addition, the 
representative’s utility that is derived from current consumption is independent of 
                                                            
4
 See also Jermann (1998) for more details on the specification of the firm’s production 
function. 
5
 See, for example, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Alli et al. (1993) and Baker and Smith 
(2006). 
  =  −  − ! (2) 
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past consumption behavior. In line with Constantinides (1990) and others, we 
extend the utility function to incorporate internal habit formation.6 In this case, the 
representative household’s level of satisfaction from consumption is determined 
not only by current consumption but also by past consumption.  
Constantinides (1990) shows that this feature resolves Mehra and 
Prescott’s (1985) equity premium puzzle and generally results in smoother 
optimal household consumption patterns.    In this case, the household’s objective 
function #$, is: 
 
for 0 ≤ &, '; 0 < * < 1.		- is the consumption of the household,	* determines the 
time devoted to market activities (Campbell, 1994 and Cooley and Prescott, 
1995), .	denotes the hours worked, & determines the strength of the habit motive 
and ' is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) of the household.  The s 
superscript on . denotes the supply of labor.  / is the time discount factor. Labor 
hours worked are normalized so that 1 − . denotes the time available for leisure. 
                                                            
6
 See, for example, Constantinides (1990), Carroll (2000), Carroll et al. (2000), Dynan 
(2000), Boldrin et al. (2001), Seckin (2001), Otrok et al. (2002), Gershun (2010) among 
others. 
 Ψ$, = max34 ,546 ,74 8 9:/; <-=; − &-=;>1 − =;. >?@1 − '
A
;BC D 
      
(3) 
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In this framework, consumption comes from two sources. First, the 
household receives labor income of  . .  Second, it can choose to hold 	shares in the representative firm.  Cash can then be generated from this equity 
holding both from the dividend   and by selling shares at the market 
price	E. The household budget constraint determines this price of equity: 
 
2.2 The Manager Objective Function and the Capital Accumulation 
Process 
Differences between the “basic” model, the UM model, and the VM-CAC model 
arise from the managers’ objective function, #F, , and the process that determines 
the evolution of capital within the firm.   
Managers have control over two variables ( and ) at any time, , to 
maximize their objective function.  In both the “basic” and VM-CAC models, the 
assumption is that managers aim to maximize shareholder wealth, E .  By 
contrast, following Radner (1970), Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972), among 
others, the UM model is based on the assumption that managers are risk-averse 
and act in a way that satisfies their own personal objective function rather than 
maximizing the share price of their firm. Carceles-Poveda (2005, 2009) shows 
 C =  . + +  −E . (4) 
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that the risk aversion assumption improves our understanding of managers’ 
behavior. We summarize the manager’s objective function as: 
where 'F  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the manager and H is the 
subjective discount factor. This is an appropriate utility function if managers’ 
income comes solely from income derived from the ownership of equity in his/her 
own firm.7 There is some support for this from studies, which show how poorly 
diversified entrepreneur’s portfolios often are; e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000).  
Alternately, we might imagine that the manager is rewarded though a salary and 
bonus policy that is linked to the firm’s dividend payouts. This managerial utility 
function has previously been used by Carceles-Poveda (2003).  
The second key difference between the “basic” model, the UM model, and 
the VM-CAC model is related to the capital accumulation process.  In the “basic” 
and UM models, the capital employed in the firm develops according to  =
                                                            
7
 While, under this assumption, the manager’s salary comes entirely from dividends, it is 
also necessary to assume that the manager holds an infinitesimally small fraction of the 
equity.  This is because, within this model, all dividends go to the household.  We thank 
an anonymous referee for this point.   
 
ΨF, = IJK
JLmax54M ,N4 8 9:H; =;
@O − 11 − 'F
A
;BC D ,																																						UMmax54M ,N4E 	,																																																														VM − CAC
T
 
  
 
 
(5) 
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1	 − 	U	 +	!, where U denotes the capital depreciation rate.  By contrast, 
in the VM-CAC model, the capital accumulation process is given by 
where V· is a concave capital adjustment cost function and ζ determines the 
level of capital adjustment costs. Given this economic friction, the elasticity of 
investment is expected to be lower than in a model without CAC.  Specifically, 
we follow Gershun (2010) and set 
Notice that, the lower the value of  ζ, the higher the capital adjustment cost.  
Ultimately, as Y → ∞, the capital adjustment cost goes to zero and the VM-CAC 
model becomes the “basic” model.  We refer to this last case as the “VM-no-CAC 
model”.   
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions 
General equilibrium exists in this economy when both the firm and the household 
are able to simultaneously maximize their objective functions. This leads to five 
first-order conditions that can be algebraically rearranged to give: 
  =	 1	 − 	U	 + 	V! 	, , U	, ζ	 (6) 
 V!, , U, Y = U/]1 − 1Y ^
!_/] + U1 − Y	. (7) 
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where `=; = abc,4a34de/abc,4a34 	 is the household’s inter-temporal marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption between times  and  + ℎ. Notice that the last of 
these equations is just the standard Euler equation that is used widely in asset 
pricing. 
In addition to these conditions, labor and capital markets must clear. This 
leads to three further constraints.  First, the supply and demand of labor must be 
equal, . = .  Second, the firm has one share in issue at all times,  = 1.  
Finally, output must be either consumed or re-invested,  = - + !. 
To simultaneously solve this set of six equations, we use Dynare software 
in conjunction with Matlab. This allows us to determine the steady state growth 
rates of several underlying macroeconomic and financial variables, together with 
 
1 =
IJJ
KJ
JL 8 gH^ =_@O ^	= hih + 1 − U_j , UM
hVh! 8< `=? k	= hih + 1− U + V + 
hVh hVh! l , VM − CAC
T
 
  
 
 
 
(8) 
   = 1 − m  (9) 
 E = 8< `=E= + =? (10) 
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a variance-covariance matrix of the growth rates of each of these variables, and 
impulse response functions.8 
2.4 Calibration 
This subsection describes the parameter values used in our baseline calibrations. 
Further evidence on the sensitivity of our results to the parameter values is 
provided in subsection 3.1. 
For the Cobb-Douglas production function, the values of the capital 
elasticity of output m = 0.36, the depreciation rate U = 0.025, and the quarterly 
trend in labor augmenting technical change x = 1.005 are taken from Kydland 
and Prescott (1982) and Jermann (1998). These values are also commonly used in 
long-term economic and finance models (e.g. Hansen, 1985; Campbell, 1994; 
Jermann, 1998).  In line with Hansen (1985), the stochastic technology shock (	) 
follows an AR(1) process with a persistence parameter  = 0.95 and standard 
deviation  = 0.00712. 
For the household, we choose / = 0.99, which is standard in the literature 
(e.g. Hansen, 1985; Prescott, 1986; Campbell, 1994; and Jermann, 1998).  We 
follow Carceles-Poveda (2003) by setting ' = 1.44.  The value of ' falls within 
the 1 to 5 range, which is again generally considered reasonable by many 
economists (e.g. Jermann, 1998; Carceles-Poveda, 2003; and Gershun, 2010).  In 
                                                            
8
 The impulse response functions are available on request from the authors. 
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the sensitivity analysis, we vary ' between 0 and 100.  The estimated value of the 
agent’s internal consumption habit persistence parameter & = 0.82 is equivalent 
to the figure estimated by Jermann (1998). The value * = 0.36  for the time 
devoted to market activities is obtained from Campbell (1994).9 
Following Carceles-Poveda (2003), we set manager’s stochastic subjective 
discount factor to	H = 0.99. We also set the manager’s risk aversion coefficient 
to 'F 	= 1.25 and 5 to indicate low and high levels of risk aversion, respectively.  
Both these risk aversion values lie within the one to five range that many 
economists consider to be realistic (e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004; Parrino et 
al., 2005; and An and Cheung, 2010).  We also vary this figure between 0 and 100 
to examine the sensitivity of dividend cyclicality to the manager’s degree of risk 
aversion.   
In the VM-CAC economy, the parameter value determining capital 
adjustment costs is set to (1) Y = 40 for relatively low capital adjustment costs 
                                                            
9
 Because of the concavity of the CAC function, it is more costly to adjust the 
investment-to-capital ratio upwards than adjust it downwards. It should be noted that 
CACs are not always considered in the function of capital accumulation but can instead 
be captured in the goods clearing condition. This is because some scholars assert that the 
influence of capital adjustment costs is on the amount of output, not the amount of 
capital.  For the case of not putting capital adjustment costs in the capital accumulation 
process, see Danthine and Donaldson (2002).  For papers considering capital adjustment 
costs in the function of the capital accumulation process, see, for example, Danthine and 
Donaldson (2002), Canzoneri et al. (2006), Collard and Dellas (2006) and Gershun 
(2010). 
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following Gershun (2010) and (2) Y	 = 0.30 for relatively high capital adjustment 
costs, which is similar to the value used by Jermann (1998).    
 
3 Results 
We report the results for six models, each both with (& = 0.82 and without 
(& = 0 household habit formation, giving a total of twelve models. The first is 
the “basic” VM-no-CAC economic framework with no capital adjustment costs 
and a manager who aims to maximize shareholder wealth; this is the standard 
DSGE model.  The next three models are for the utility maximizing (UM) 
manager with different levels of risk aversion; risk neutrality 'F = 0	and both 
low 'F = 1.25	and high 'F = 5	risk aversion.  The final two models are low 
(Y = 40) and high (Y = 0.30) capital adjustment cost VM-CAC models. 
In Table 1 we report eight summary statistics for each model. These refer 
to the cyclicality and volatility of dividends, consumption, labor hours, and 
investment.  The former considers the correlation between the growth of each 
variable and GDP growth.  The latter is the standard deviation of each variable 
after it has been normalized by GDP.  This table also reports the observed U.S. 
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macroeconomic statistics from 1984:1 to 2010:2, with all data detrended with a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter.10   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
It is clear that the basic VM-no-CAC model fails in a wide variety of 
ways.  Most crucially from this paper’s perspective, optimal equity payout 
behavior is predicted to be strongly counter-cyclical; -0.96 and -0.98 in the 
presence and absence of habit formation, respectively.  This feature has also been 
reported in prior studies (see, for example, Alessandrini, 2003; Carceles-Poveda, 
2009 and Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). However, this finding contrasts sharply 
with observed payout policy, which indicates a correlation between real equity 
payouts and real GDP of +50% for the period 1984:1-2010:2. For the other three 
variables, the predicted correlation is relatively close to the observed levels, 
except for consumption when the household has a habit formation utility function. 
                                                            
10
  The data we use are taken from Jermann and Quadrini (2012)’s technical appendix 
which is online at the American Economic Review website.  Their data are obtained from 
the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board (FFA) and the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  Real GDP and consumption of non-durables and 
services are obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.3. Equity payout is the net value of “net 
dividends (Nonfinancial Corporate Business, F.102, line 3) minus the total of “net new 
equity issue” (Nonfinancial Corporate Business (F.102, line38).  All data are seasonally 
adjusted and detrended with a band-pass filter that preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years with 12 
lags suggested by Baxter and King (1999).  The band-pass filter codes can be found at 
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The basic model also predicts dividends that are too volatile, while consumption, 
investment and labor hours are too smooth. Changing the model to incorporate a 
risk-neutral manager only makes matters worse for a number of diagnostics, 
including the fact that consumption is now predicted to be countercyclical.  
When we introduce either (i) relatively low levels of risk aversion for 
managers, 'F = 1.25, and a household either with or without habit formation, or 
(ii) high capital adjustment costs, Y = 0.30, when investors have habit formation, 
then we derive a much better understanding of dividend cyclicality. In each case, 
the correlation between equity payout growth with GDP growth is extremely 
similar to that observed in the real data. This is consistent with Carceles-Poveda 
(2009) for the UM model, although we do not rely here on incomplete markets 
and heterogeneous agents.   
The intuition behind this result is that, as shown by Carceles-Poveda 
(2003), with either risk-averse managers or CAC, investment becomes less 
volatile.  In economic booms, risk-averse managers may be less inclined to place 
money in projects with uncertain future equity payouts in case the state of the 
economy changes while high capital adjustment costs make it less attractive for 
managers to re-invest. These arguments suggest that firms may have more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Kanda Naknoi’s website:    
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/knaknoi/Econ635/matlab_filter.html.   
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incentive to pay out cash in the form of dividends when profits are high, which 
helps reconcile the theory with the observed data.   
We further notice from Table 1 that the cyclical behavior of equity 
payouts is sensitive to managerial risk aversion and CAC. With low CAC, for 
example, optimal equity policy remains countercyclical, while for high levels of 
managerial risk aversion, optimal dividend policy is too pro-cyclical. We 
therefore concentrate on three models:  low levels of managerial risk aversion 
('F = 1.25) both with and without habit, and high CACs (Y = 0.30) with habit.   
When considering the broader macroeconomy, each of these three models 
has different strengths and weaknesses.  The presence of habit formation helps to 
better explain the volatility of hours worked but cannot capture this variable’s 
pro-cyclicality.  The VM-CAC model captures better the volatility of dividend 
payments when compared to the UM specifications.  By contrast, the UM models 
slightly better explain the volatility of investment, although this remains too low 
in all cases. 
Given the differences in performance of the twelve different models across 
each of the eight diagnostics considered, we construct three meta-statistics to 
better understand their relative overall performance.  First, for each model, we 
calculate the average absolute difference between the predicted and observed 
correlations between dividends, consumption, labor hours and investment with 
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GDP.  This average is termed the “Correlation Error”.  We also calculate the 
absolute difference between the predicted and observed standard deviation of 
these variables when normalized by GDP.  These are then standardized by the 
observed standard deviation in each case before being averaged; this is referred to 
as the “Standard Deviation Error”.  The final meta-statistic, “Total Error”, for 
each model is then the average of the correlation and standard deviation errors.  
Results are reported in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
We can see that five models perform poorly as they are in the bottom half 
of all specifications for all three of the meta-statistics.  Worst of all are the utility-
maximizing models when it is assumed that the firm manager is risk-neutral. The 
basic model, with neither capital adjustment costs nor agency problems, also 
performs poorly. Finally the habit formation, VM-CAC model with low 
adjustment costs, can clearly be rejected by the data.  Five other models, by 
contrast, are in the top half for each of the three meta-statistics. These include all 
four of the UM models with risk averse managers, and the VM-CAC model with 
high capital adjustment costs and a representative household with habit formation 
utility.   
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The three models that we have particularly shortlisted for consideration, 
given their high ability to explain the correlation between dividend and GDP 
growth, feature in the top three positions according to the total error statistic. 
They also feature first, second on fifth on the standard deviation error statistic, 
even though their ability to explain volatility was not a criterion for their 
selection. From this it is clear that including either capital adjustment costs or a 
value-maximizing risk-averse manager makes a material improvement on the 
standard economic model across a wide range of metrics covering volatility and 
covariance. For the UM model, this finding is not particularly sensitive to either 
the level of risk aversion of the manager (although the low risk aversion manager 
specification is preferred), or the presence or absence of household habit 
formation. The UM, mild risk aversion, with habit model is perhaps of particular 
note as it lies within the top three models for all of the meta-statistics considered.   
3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In Figures 1 and 2, we explore the sensitivity of dividend cyclicality to the choice 
of 'F   and Y for different levels of '. For the UM model, the results are largely 
insensitive to ' .  The pro-cyclicality of equity payouts declines steeply with 
'F < 1.25 , but, above this level, equity payouts quickly become highly pro-
cyclical at a relatively steady level.  For the VM-CAC model, there is greater 
sensitivity of the results with respect to ', especially when Y < 10.  Our baseline 
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calibration value of ' = 1.44 is at the lower end of standard estimates. With 
higher values of ', an even higher capital adjustment cost is required to explain 
the observed pro-cyclicality of payout policy. 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 1 & 2 around here 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Results detailing the sensitivity of dividend and consumption pro-
cyclicality to a wide range of plausible parameter values are presented in Tables 3 
(for the UM model) and 4 (for the VM-CAC model).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 & 4 around here 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
For the UM model with 'F = 1.25, there is relatively low sensitivity of the 
correlation between dividends and output for most parameters considered (m, U, &, 
x, * and ) and aggregate consumption is positively related to output in all cases, 
with this relationship becoming stronger when the manager becomes more risk-
averse ('F=5).  The pro-cyclicality of dividends is, however, sensitive to the 
stochastic time discount factor (/) and the persistence of technology shocks (). 
As expected, dividends are more pro-cyclical when technology persistence 
becomes stronger, except potentially in the case of extremely risk averse 
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managers.  As the rate of pure time preference increases (/  decreases), the 
relationship between output and dividends becomes less positive.    
The VM-CAC model is more sensitive to parameter choices than the UM 
model.  Dividends can become negatively related to output not only with low 
CAC but also in the case of high CAC in the presence of relatively strong habit 
persistence or low persistence of technology shocks. In addition, aggregate 
dividends in the VM-low-CAC model are not as sensitive to parameter choices as 
in the VM-high-CAC model. Aggregate dividends become less positively related 
to output when the time discount factor, habit persistence, the elasticity of 
consumption, and the depreciation rate are high and when the persistence of 
technology shocks is low.   
While we have been able to reconcile observed behavior with general 
equilibrium using either the UM or VM-CAC models in economies without 
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets, we believe that the former is more 
realistic than the latter. An estimate of 'F = 1.25  is broadly consistent with 
standard estimates of risk aversion. By contrast, the level of capital adjustment 
cost implicit in the Y = 0.30 case is very large. Taking as an example a firm that 
wishes to invest 5% of new capital into its firm: !/ 	= 0.05. If Y = 0.30, 
then, from Equation 7, only 0.0336	makes its way into the firm and the rest 
is lost to frictions. This means that only two-thirds of the money re-invested 
becomes effective. With lower levels of CAC, the model has lower explanatory 
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power. Further, the explanatory power is more robust to parameter value changes 
for the UM model than the VM-CAC model. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have described two general equilibrium models that explain why 
external changes in the economic environment result in businesses systematically 
implementing pro-cyclical equity payout policies. This resolves an anomaly that 
is present in many previous general equilibrium studies.  In addition, our more 
sophisticated models are able to capture a number of other features of the 
observed macroeconomy that are poorly captured by a basic DSGE framework. 
Our preferred model is based on the assumption that managers maximize 
their own objective function rather than the share price of their firms. This makes 
them more reluctant to re-invest in the business in economic booms in case 
conditions change. More cash can then be paid out when times are good. Even 
with relatively low levels of managerial risk aversion, the calibrated theoretical 
model matches the summary statistics of historical data well. 
An alternative model that we have analyzed includes capital adjustment 
costs within an economy where managers maximize their current share price. 
These frictions also inhibit managers from heavily re-investing in a pro-cyclical 
manner, and the resultant payout policy moves in line with the economy. 
However, in this case, the level of capital adjustment costs needs to be high to 
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accurately calibrate the model in a manner that is consistent with the data and 
therefore we believe this is the less credible explanation of the payout pro-
cyclicality anomaly.  These findings support the idea that agency conflicts play an 
important role in real business cycle models.   
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Fig. 1. The correlation (Z axis) between equity payouts and output growth in the 
utility-maximization (UM) model across various levels of risk aversion of the 
firm, 'F  (X axis) and the household, ' (Y axis).  The value of risk aversion ranges 
from zero (risk-neutral) to one hundred (extremely risk-averse). 
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Fig. 2. The correlation (Z axis) between equity payouts and output growth in 
the value maximization (VM-CAC) model across various levels of capital 
adjustment costs (X axis) and risk aversion of the household, '  (Y axis).  The 
variable Y  on the X axis determines the level of capital adjustment costs; the 
lower the value of  Y, the higher the costs. 
  
Table 1   
Modeled and observed summary statistics for the macroeconomy 
Note: This table shows the predicted values of (i) the correlation between the growth of each variable (dividends, consumption, hours 
worked and investment) and GDP growth, (ii) the standard deviation of each variable, normalized by GDP and (iii) the observed value of 
each variable from the US economy.   
a See notes to Footnote 10. 
  
 Baseline Models  Advanced Specifications  
 
 
US 
Dataa 
 
(1984:1
-
2010:2) 
 
With/without habit 
 
Model type 
No 
Habit 
 Habit 
 
No Habit 
 
Habit 
VM VM UM UM UM VM-CAC 
VM-
CAC UM UM UM 
VM-
CAC 
VM-
CAC 
Model 
specification 
No-
CAC 
 No-
CAC 
 Risk 
Neutral 
Mild  
risk-
averse 
('F=1.25) 
Strong  
risk-
averse 
(γw=5) 
Low 
CAC 
(Y=40) 
High 
CAC 
(Y=0.30) 
 Risk 
Neutral 
Mild  
risk-
averse 
(γw=1.25) 
Strong  
risk-
averse 
(γw=5) 
Low 
CAC 
(Y =40) 
High 
CAC 
(Y=0.30) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Correlation with GDP 
       Dividends -0.98  -0.96  -0.95 0.50 0.90 -0.98 1.00  -0.99 0.55 0.86 -0.95 0.55 0.50 
       Consumption 0.94  0.51  -0.85 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00  -0.08 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.97 0.97 
       Hours worked 0.98  0.98  0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 -1.00  0.97 -0.23 -0.22 0.98 -0.56 0.84 
       Investment 0.99  0.98  0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00  0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.78 0.88 
Standard deviation                 
       Dividends 3.87  5.47  14.08 0.12 0.08 3.52 2.39  6.35 0.14 0.10 5.36 2.18 1.30 
       Consumption 0.35  0.26  1.18 0.87 0.87 0.41 1.19  0.15 0.87 0.87 0.27 1.06 1.92 
       Hours worked 0.46  0.41  1.41 0.09 0.09 0.42 0.13  1.45 1.86 1.89 0.36 1.83 1.56 
       Investment 2.95  3.58  7.04 1.38 1.38 2.81 0.44  3.96 1.37 1.37 3.53 1.18 5.99 
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Table 2  
Meta-statistics on model performance 
    Correlation Standard 
Dev 
Total  Correlation Standard Dev Total 
Model Specification Habit?  Error Error Error  Ranking Ranking Ranking 
UM Mild risk-aversion No habit  0.076 0.793 0.435  1 5 1 
VM-CAC High CAC Habit  0.388 0.524 0.456  4 1 2 
UM Mild risk-aversion Habit  0.318 0.601 0.459  3 2 3 
UM Strong risk-aversion No habit  0.178 0.801 0.489  2 6 4 
UM Strong risk-aversion Habit  0.393 0.612 0.503  5 3 5 
VM-CAC Low CAC No habit  0.436 0.938 0.687  6 7 6 
VM-CAC High CAC No habit  0.622 0.764 0.693  10 4 7 
Basic (VM No-CAC)  No habit  0.440 1.003 0.722  7 8 8 
VM-CAC Low CAC Habit  0.528 1.289 0.908  8 9 9 
Basic (VM No-CAC)  Habit  0.540 1.303 0.921  9 10 10 
UM Risk Neutral Habit  0.697 1.305 1.001  11 11 11 
UM Risk Neutral No habit  0.869 2.622 1.746  12 12 12 
Note: This table reports each model’s performance by ranking correlation errors, standard deviation errors and total errors of all models. 
  
Table 3  
Sensitivity analysis for UM model 
'F = 1.25  'F = 5 //F (the stochastic time discount factor) 
0.100 0.500 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 0.100 0.500 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 
corr(d,y) 1.00 0.97 0.59 0.55 0.46 0.29 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.49 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 m (output elasticity of capital) 
0.09 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65   0.09 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65 
corr(d,y) 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
x (the quarterly trend growth rate of effective labor) 
1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 U (the depreciation rate, note that we assume the calibration is in a quarterly model) 
Annual rate 0.010 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.400 0.010 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.400 
Quarterly rate 0.003 0.013 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100   0.003 0.013 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 
corr(d,y) 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  (the persistence of time-series technology shocks) 
0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 
corr(d,y) 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.55 0.73 0.82 0.53 0.53 0.73 0.86 0.80 0.61 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98   0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 & (habit persistence) 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 
corr(d,y) 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.86 0.75 0.30 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 * (time devoted to provide labor) 
0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99   0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.91 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: This table reports the correlations of the growth of dividends and consumption with GDP 
growth by varying the range of the parameter values for the UM model.  
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Table 4   
Sensitivity analysis for VM-CAC model 
Y = 40 Y = 0.30 //F (the stochastic time discount factor) 
0.900 0.970 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 0.900 0.970 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 
corr(d,y) 
-0.42 -0.87 -0.93 -0.95 -0.97 -0.98 0.99 0.88 0.69 0.55 0.32 0.06 
corr(c,y) 0.77 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 m (output elasticity of capital) 
0.10 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65 0.10 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65 
corr(d,y) 
-0.89 -0.94 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.66 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.49 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.90 
x (the quarterly trend growth rate of effective labor) 
1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 
corr(d,y) 
-0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 U (the depreciation rate, note that we assume the calibration is in a quarterly model) 
Annual rate 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.60 
Quarterly rate 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 0.150 
corr(d,y) 
-0.96 -0.95 -0.93 -0.91 -0.84 -0.78 0.70 0.55 0.42 0.35 0.23 0.19 
corr(c,y) 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.78 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98  (the persistence of time-series technology shocks) 
0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 
corr(d,y) 
-1.00 -1.00 -0.99 -0.95 -0.92 -0.85 -0.97 -0.93 -0.09 0.55 0.62 0.62 
corr(c,y) 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 
corr(d,y) 
-0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 & (habit persistence) 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 
corr(d,y) 
-0.98 -0.96 -0.95 -0.95 -0.97 -1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.55 -0.03 -0.99 
corr(c,y) 0.96 0.93 0.85 0.55 0.39 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.29 
* (time devoted to provide labor) 
0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99 0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99 
corr(d,y) 
-0.96 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.74 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.21 -0.20 
corr(c,y) 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.90 
Note: This table reports the correlations of the growth of dividends and consumption with GDP 
growth by varying the range of the parameter values for the VM-CAC model. 
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Why are Aggregate Equity Payouts Pro-cyclical? 
 
2014 
Highlights (for review) 
 
• Our study uses two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to explain why 
external changes in the economic environment result in businesses systematically 
implementing pro-cyclical equity payout policies.  More importantly, this work provides 
an alternative resolution to examine the cyclicality of payouts that many previous studies 
have found anomalous.  
 
• Both models endogenize low elasticity of investment. 
 
• The first model follows the agency conflict literature by assuming that risk-averse 
managers maximize their own objective function in preference to the share price of the 
firm.  Risk-averse managers dislike taking on risky projects and may reject potentially 
profitable reinvestment opportunities.  This results in greater payouts in benign economic 
conditions.  
 
• The second model includes capital adjustment costs within an economy without agency 
conflicts. These frictions also inhibit managers from heavily re-investing in a pro-cyclical 
manner, and the resultant payout policy moves in line with the economy.    
 
• Our results suggest that the first model better explains the payout pro-cyclicality anomaly 
than the second model.  
 
• Our study highlights the role that agency conflicts can play in real business cycle models.    
 
